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A b s t r a c t - - T h i s  paper presents a compilation of  experimental data on radiation fields found in commercial 
nuclear power plants. Exposure rates for systems and components  are described by average values, a l though 
these averages may  be significantly low (by orders of  magnitude) near localized "hot  spots". Conditions 
for, and exposure rates from, important  fields are cited for both normal  and abnormal  operating conditions. 
Away from hot primary components,  exposure rates for both ~ and neutron fields typically range from 0 
to 1000 mrem h -  ~. Photon fields are most  frequently the result of  decay from neutron activated materials 
or fission product deposits. Neutron fields exhibit well-moderated spectra, with few neutrons above 750 
keV. There seems to be no correlation between 7 and neutron fields in a typical nuclear power plant outside 
the reactor core. 
l. INTRODUCTION 
As part of  a program to assess the potential for mobile robots 
in nuclear power plants, a survey was conducted to determine 
typical neutron and photon radiation fields which could be 
expected during normal  operations, shutdowns and abnor- 
mal situations. Because of  the difficulty in obtaining this type 
of information, we have synthesized and integrated data and 
present it below. While we believe this information to be 
"representative" for design purposes, the reader is cautioned 
that the exposures quoted can vary substantially depending 
on the particular plant, location and situation. As such, 
these values should be interpreted as "order of  magni tude"  
estimates. 
In order to protect plant personnel and electronics from 
radiation exposure, statements such as: "near  steam gen- 
erators, exposure rates of  X mrad h -  1 of  Y eV ys can be 
expected" are desired. However, such statements can rarely 
be made. As yet, the fundamental  knowledge of the mech- 
anisms that  lead to radiation buildup in power plants has 
not  been applied to these problems, al though trends have 
been observed. In addition, quoted field values frequently do 
not  describe how or precisely where the measurements  were 
made. As a result, the best one can hope for is a range of 
values and an understanding of  the general factors which 
influence the magnitude and spectrum of the 7 and neutron 
radiation fields. 
In Section 2 we present a summary  of  operating and 
shutdown exposure rates for boiling water reactors (BWRs) 
and pressurized water reactors (PWRs). In Section 3, the 
principal factors which influence variations in these field 
strengths are discussed. In Sections 4 and 5, the y and neutron 
fields, respectively, are individually addressed. Section 6 
examines extreme accident fields. Section 7 summarizes the 
material presented. 
2. AVERAGE FIELD STRENGTHS 
The assimilated radiation field data are presented in Tables 
1-5, and Figs 1 2. All values can be assumed to represent 
the total combined neutron and y field strengths, except as 
noted. Table 1 presents a compilation of shutdown and at- 
power data for selected P W R  systems and components.  The 
data are derived from three general sources- -s tudies  which 
compare the accuracy of different detector types, studies 
which monitor  radiation buildup in a few specific com- 
ponents over many  plants during shutdown, and new reactor 
startup test reports. The studies which compare different 
neutron detector types highlight the difficulty of  providing 
accurate data in intense fields (Rathbun,  1983), but also 
provide data  on the specific components  measured. The 
studies which monitor  a few specific components  show 
large variations between measured radiation fields at identical 
positions in different plants, but  again provide good data on 
these components.  The startup testing reports provide fairly 
complete mappings of  intense, at-power fields, but  are 
expected to represent less accurate data. This data will also 
not show the effects of  radiation buildup normally present 
at more mature plants. 
The at-power data presented in Table 1 show a large range 
of  values. The most  intense fields shown are near the vessel 
head and directly above the vessel. These locations do not  
benefit from the cylindrical biological shield, and have large 
neutron components.  The reactor coolant pumps  also show 
large neutron and V field intensities. The variation in reported 
data  ranges over an order of  magnitude for both the neutron 
and Y fields. The data presented for the reactor coolant pip- 
ing system also varies by an order of  magnitude,  with the 
most  intense radiation measured between the reactor coolant 
pump and steam generator. The intense fields present at the 
adjacent components  may be contributing to this higher 
value and therefore not  reflect radiation being emitted solely 
from the piping. Steam generator data are shown for both 
inside and outside the steam generator shielding, and clearly 
show the benefitial effect of  the shield. 
Table 2 presents average shutdown P W R  field data, taken 
primary from Beal et al. (1987) in a condensed format. 
During shutdown, one can expect the majority of  the radi- 
ation to consist of  7 fields. The dose rates in Table 2 are thus 
91 
92 Technical  Notes  
Table 1. PWR system/component dose rates 
Dose rate (rem h ~) 
System/component Shutdown Operating 
Reactor equipment 
Reactor vessel 
Above (during vessel operations) 0.025 1.4 
Keyways (below) 0.7 2001 - -  
Under vessel head 5-151 394-1300 (n) 
Refueling machine - -  60 (n) 752 
Operating deck (edge of reactor cavity) 0 -6t (7) 
5-7.7 (n) 
Main heat transport system 
Main coolant pumps 0.065~).360 2 22 (n) 
2 25 ~ ('g) 
Reactor coolant piping system 0.02-0.270 2.33 354(7) 
Steam generators (internal) 
Channel head exposure ranges 6-24 - -  
< 4.5 EFPY s average 9 - -  
>4.5 EFPY average 12 15 - -  
At manway and inside 5.1 - -  
Steam generators (external) 
Inside bioshield 0.025-12 3-13.75 
Outside bioshield 0.11 0.16-2.75 
Pressurizer 0.095 5.5 
Residual heat removal system 
RHR pumps 0.1 0.050 
RHR piping and heat exchanger 0.065 0.065 
Other measured positions 
Valves (miscellaneous) 0.075-1 - -  
Spent resin loading area 2 1-20 
Regenerative heat exchanger 0.5-5 - -  
(Scaglia and Bergmann, 1987 ; Beal et al., 1987 ; Bradshaw, 1987 ; Roberson et al., 1984 ; 
White et al., 1984; VEPCo, 1979; Vance et al., 1978; Vergnaud, 1984; Uhrig, 1977) 
Values listed as rad h ~. For 7 rays, 1 rad ~ h ~ is approximately equal to 1 rem h J. 
2 Value is quoted as 60 rem h ~ neutrons. A value of 75 rein h ~ total field strength is obtained 
by using nearby y/neutron field intensity ratios. 
3 Value quoted is rad h t. A conversion factor of unity is assumed. 
4 Measured by contact on pipe between reactor coolant pump and steam generator, and pre- 
sented as rad h i. 
5 Plant operating time in units of effective full power years (EFPY). 
averages  of  typical  ),-field values f rom several  p lan ts  and  
excludes da ta  taken near  hot  spots. For  example,  ho t  spots 
in reactor  coo lan t  p ip ing  have yielded 2 rem h -  ~ shu tdown  
7 fields a l though  the expected field s t rength  is an order  of  
magn i tude  less. The  mos t  intense shu tdown  field repor ted,  
up to 200 rem h ~, occurs  under  the reac tor  vessel in the 
keyways.  
Table  3 gives b road  area averages  for P W R  con ta inmen t s  
when the p lan t  is opera t ing  a t - p o w e r ,  whereas Tables  1 and  2 
p r imar i ly  present  da ta  near  specific systems or components .  
In this  table,  7 and  neu t ron  con t r ibu t ions  are explici t ly  de- 
l ineated.  N o t e  tha t  these b road  area  averages  are signific- 
an t ly  lower  than  the measured  values  near  the p r ima ry  
components .  The  area a round  the reac tor  cavi ty  includes 
some spots  close to ho t  p r ima ry  componen t s ,  however.  The 
generic ca tegory  of  o ther  levels includes middle  and  lower 
levels o f  con ta inment .  Because of  the b io logica l  shield, the 
middle  level dose values  are typical ly  smal ler  t han  the oper-  
a t ing  level. The same is true for the lower level, a l t hough  to 
a lesser degree. F igure  1 presents  a coheren t  view of  selected 
da ta  f rom Tables  I -3  schemat ical ly .  
D a t a  for B W R s  are given in Tables  4 and  5, and  Fig. 2. 
Table  4 presents  shu tdown  and  a t -power  da ta  for selected 
B W R  systems and  componen t s  of  par t i cu la r  impor t ance  to 
personnel  exposure.  However ,  no a t -power  rad ia t ion  maps  
of  the drywell  were obta ined.  This  may  be par t ia l ly  because 
the drywell  is no t  in tended  to be hab i t ab le  du r ing  opera t ion ,  
f requent ly  hav ing  intense rad ia t ion  fields (es t imated on the 
order  of  102 rem h -  ~) and  an iner t  a tmosphere .  Except  for 
ra ther  s imple  ins t rumenta t ion ,  mos t  conven t iona l  instru-  
men ta t i on  packages  could  no t  w i th s t and  this  env i ronmen t  
for an  extended period.  Opera t ing  d a t a  for outs ide  the 
drywell  were p r imar i ly  ob ta ined  f rom the Fermi - I I  B W R .  
Tables  4 and  5 present  a more  comple te  picture  of  the 
shu tdown  rad ia t ion  fields a t  BWRs.  As  wi th  PWRs ,  large 
va r ia t ions  in r ad ia t ion  fields on  ind iv idua l  c o m p o n e n t s  are 
seen. For  example ,  values  of  0.025 to 1.2 rem h -  ~ are repor ted 
on reci rcula t ion line piping,  a l t hough  the average value 
across several  p lan ts  was only  0.260 rein h -  ~. Similar ly,  the 
reac tor  water  c leanup  ( R W C U )  p u m p  inlet  da t a  ex tend  f rom 
0.015 to 2.58 rem h t, bu t  the average  over  several  p lan t s  
was 0.375 rem h -  ~. Fo r  the R W C U  p u m p  outlet ,  it is inter-  
es t ing tha t  the opera t ing  value  quo ted  for a new p lan t  is less 
than  some shudown  values a t  more  ma tu re  plants .  Possible 
reasons  for this  are discussed in Sect ion 3 below. F igure  2 
shows a schematic  view of  selected da ta  f rom Tables  4 and  5. 
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Table 2. PWR system shutdown dose rates (>25 mrem h ~) 
Average 
dose rate l 
Description (mrem h l) 
Reactor equipment 
Reactor vessel closure and attachments 650 
Reactor vessel studs, fasteners, seals and gaskets 140 
Reactor vessel upper and lower internals 800 
Control rod drives 1400 
Main heat transport system 
Main coolant pumps and drive 65 
Main coolant pumps foundations/skids 40 
Reactor coolant piping system 270 
Steam generators 
--at manway and inside steam generator 5100 
--manway vicinity and general area 110 
Pressurizer 95 
Pressurizer relief tank 32 
Residual heat removal system 35-65 
Safety injection system 
Boron injection tanks 70 
Safety injection system piping system 55 
Containment spray system 
Containment spray instrumentation and control 120 
Liquid waste system 
Primary equipment drain system 
Tanks, pumps and motors 250 
Equipment drain filter 50 
Equipment drain piping system 35 
Miscellaneous drain waste system 
Tanks, pumps and motors 170 
Waste filters, demineralizers 150 
Miseellaneous waste piping system 75 
Chemical waste system 
Tanks, pumps and motors 60 
Regenerative chemical waste system 
Demineralizers, filters and evaporator 100 
Solid waste system 
Dry active waste volume 
Tanks, pumps and motors 120 
Filters 2000 
Fuel handling and storage 
Transfer systems 210 
Reactor service and fuel storage pool 
Spent fuel pool cleaning and purification 85 
equipment 
Reactor makeup water system 
Reactor makeup water tank 120 
Coolant treatment and recycle 
CVCS 2 heat transfer equipment 80 
CVCS tanks and pressure vessels 140 
CVCS purification and filtration equipment 1800 
CVCS piping system 95 
Boron recycle system pumps, motors, tanks and 100 
equipment 
Boron recycle system purification and filter 38 
equipment 
Auxiliary cooling systems 
Nuclear service water system 
Cooling tower piping system 80 
(Roberson et al., 1984; Beal et al., 1987) 
Average of across-plant typical values. 
z Chemical and volume control system. 
Table 3. Containment operating dose rates 
Dose rate (mrem h-~) 
Broad area (range of values) 
Operating level, general area 
y 75 (15 500) 
n 530 (3-2200) 
Operating level, around reactor cavity 
y 400 (20-2000) 
n 2600 (90-12,500) 
Other levels, general area 
y 17 (3-500) 
n I 1 (8-200) 
Other levels, around reactor cavity 
7 100 (364000) 
n 310 (90-6000) 
(Ryan, 1983 ; Endres et al., 1981 ; Uhrig, 1977 ; SMUD, 1975 ; 
Champion e ta / . ,  1984) 
3. PRINCIPAL FACTORS AFFECTING FIELD 
STRENGTHS 
In an effort to understand the sources of the wide range 
of radiation levels measured at identical locations in similar 
plants, a number of studies have examined the sources of the 
shutdown radiation fields, and the variables which primarily 
influence these fields for BWRs and PWRs. Some results 
from these efforts are presented below. 
For BWRs, reactor water quality, 6°Co and feedwater iron 
contamination play significant roles in the radiation buildup 
in BWR primary piping (Anstine, 1983). In fact, BWR 
drywell radiation fields are determined principally by pri- 
mary piping system radioactivity. BWR hot spots have been 
found to develop from the accumulation of corrosion pro- 
ducts (Earls and Blok, 1986). 
Although the size of the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) 
system and the type of condensate treatment demineralizers 
do not correlate to radiation buildup, the exposure rates in 
the RWCU system are usually higher than in the recir- 
culation lines because of the hot spots formed by crud depo- 
sition in low flow areas. Recirculation lines are both a major 
source of drywell exposure and are geometrically similar 
from plant to plant. However, exposure rates on BWR recir- 
culation lines do not necessarily reflect buildup throughout 
the primary system (Anstine, 1983). 
For PWRs, the buildup of fields outside of the core 
depends on the quantity of corrosion and erosion products 
being activated. Thus, similar to BWRs, preventing field 
formation requires the elimination of corrosion and/or pre- 
vention of corrosion product deposition in systems external 
to the core (Burg e t  al . ,  1980, Scaglia and Bergmann, 1987). 
One other interesting insight regarding PWR exposures is 
that exposure rates outside of PWR steam generators (one 
of the main sources of personnel exposure in PWRs) do 
n o t  necessarily correlate to those found inside the steam 
generator channel head. 
A number of additional factors beyond the specific com- 
ponent surveyed or level of corrosion present influence the 
measured radiation fields, and thus the accuracy and spread 
of the measured radiation fields. These include : 
1. Shutdown vs operating condition (including percentage 
of full power), as well as time after shutdown and effective 
full power years (EFPYs) of reactor operation. However, 
operating floor dose rates are relatively uniform at each 
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Table 4. BWR system/component dose rates 
Dose rate (rein h ~) 
System/component Shutdown Operating 
Reactor equipment 
Reactor vessel operations 0.04-0.30 
Control rod drives 0.11q3.26 
Main heat transport system 
Recirculation line 0.025 1.2 - -  
Main steam line 0.002~).250 3 8 
Main stream isolation valve 0.075 0.4--8 
Feed heater pump 0.125 
Feed heaters 0.8 2 
Feedwater spargers 0.240 
Residual heat removal system 
RHR heat exchanger 0.2 0.7 0.1 
Reactor water cleanup system 
Pump inlet 0.015-2.58 - -  
Outlet 0.015 3.04 1.5 
Casing 0.025 2.00 
Valve 0.11 
Regenerative heat exchanger 0.01 (~2.8 1 
Nonregeneative heat exchanger 0.005~3.260 
Drain lines from heat exchangers 3-15 4 
Phase separator ~< 100 
Turbine building floors 0.01~5 
Moisture separator and reheaters 0.2-2 2 
Waste systems 
Spent resin tank 0.45 
Waste packing room 0.2 15 
(Anstine, 1983 ; Beal et al., 1987 ; Palino et al., 1987 ; Roberson et al., 1984 ; 
White et al., 1984; Vance et aL, 1978) 
power level (Uhrig, 1977). For older plants as a whole, P W R  
radiation fields level off after ~ 1 EFPY and BWR fields 
after ~ 4  EFPY [Beal e t  al. ,  1987; Burg et  al . ,  1980]. Water  
chemistry has received increased consideration over the last 
several years, so these two findings may no longer be as 
generally applicable. Steam generator channel exposures have 
been seen to level off at ~ 10-20 rem h - t  after 5-6 EFPY, 
and even decline slightly thereafter (Scaglia and Bergmann, 
1987). Similarly, in BWRs,  the high levels found in the recir- 
culation piping system ( ~ 8 0 0  mrem rad h -~) reach 
max imum values after 4-5 EFPY (Anstine, 1983). 
2. Decontaminat ion of  component  hot  spots nearby. Cases 
are cited of  an order-of-magnitude change in exposure rates 
over 1 m of  piping (Anstine, 1983 ; Sejvar et  al . ,  1981). 
3. Significant cladding failures. 
4. Component  wall thickness. Interestingly, P W R  steam 
generator wall thickness has been found not  to significantly 
affect external fields (Scaglia and Bergmann, 1987). 
5. Plant elevation. Measurements  made on a given com- 
ponent at an elevation corresponding to core midplane are 
frequently different than those below or above. 
6. Coolant  levels. 
7. Insulation type and thickness. 
8. Instrumentat ion used for the measurement  (Scaglia and 
Bergmann, 1987; Rathbun,  1983). 
While these factors have been identified, it has not  been 
possible to quantitatively estimate their impact on the range 
of  measured field strengths. 
4. ~,-RAY EXPOSURES 
Once a significant radiation field or hot  spot is identified, 
it is informative to determine its radiation type and spectrum. 
Depending on the location, low ( ~  100-500 keV), medium 
( ~  500-I000 keV) and/or  high ( > 1000 keV) energy photons 
can be major contributors to exposure. For example, high 
energy fields are dominant  in PWR containments  (e.g. near 
steam generators) and on BWR turbine floors. In PWRs, 
radiation under the vessel is primarily from high-energy pho- 
tons resulting from phenomena related to capture and inelas- 
tic scattering of  neutrons. In particular, 90% of  these 7s have 
an energy greater than 1 MeV and 60% have energies greater 
than 2 MeV (Earls and Blok, 1986). The PWR steam gen- 
erator channel heads (where photons of up to 8 MeV can 
be found) represent another primary source of  high-energy 
radiation fields. For BWR turbine floors during operation, 
high-energy 16N photons dominate the spectra and con- 
tribute up to 80% of  the exposure there. Nevertheless, when 
comparing p l a n t w i d e  operating vs shutdown conditions, it 
has been found that no large difference exists in the relative 
amounts  of  low- vs high-energy photons (Robertson et  al. ,  
1984). This suggests that plant history, especially water 
chemistry, is a critical factor in the magnitude of the radiation 
fields encountered. 
The major categories of  7 radiation areas are : 
(1) fields dominated by high-energy fission 7s ; 
(2) fields caused by short-lived radioactive noble gases ; 
(3) fields dominated by decay photons from radioactive 
atoms in neutron activated or fission product deposits, 
and by the scattered photon cont inuum that results from 
these deposits. 
The first category is found only during operation. The third 
category is the most  prevalent for both shutdown and oper- 
ating reactors. The neutron activated fission product isotopes 
that normally contribute to the background energy spectrum 
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Table 5. BWR system shutdown dose rates (>25  mrem h ~) 
Average 
dose rate I 
Description (mrem h -  ~) 
Reactor equipment 
Reactor vessel closure and attachments, studs, fasteners, seals, gaskets, core support 40 
and shroud assembly 
Jet pump assemblies 4400 
Fluid distribution assemblies 210 
Steam dryer assembly 800 
Control rods 170 
Control rod drives 110 
Main heat transport system 
Reactor recireulation pumps and motors 90 
Recirculation piping system 240 
Reactor recirculation instrumentation and control 200 
Residual heat removal system 
R H R  pumps and drivers 60 
R H R  heat exchangers 320 
R H R  piping system 100 
R H R  instrumentation and control 80 
Reactor core isolation cooling system 
RCIC pumps, motors and equipment 90 
RCIC piping system 100 
High pressure core spray system 
HPCS pumps, motors and strainers 30 
HPCS piping system 100 
Low pressure core spray system 
LPCS piping system 190 
Standby liquid control system 
SLCS piping system 55 
Liquid waste system 
High-purity system 
High-purity collection tanks, pumps, motors and equipment 280 
Low-purity system 
Low-purity collection tanks, pumps, motors and equipment 190 
Low-purity waste piping system 60 
Detergent waste system 
Detergent waste tanks, pumps, motors and equipment 40 
Detergent waste filter, demineralizers, R/O unit package 65 
Chemical waste system 
Chemical waste tanks, pumps, motors and equipment 40 
Solid waste system 
Dry active waste volume reduction centrifuge, pumps, motors and equipment 200 
Solid waste system piping system 250 
Fuel handling and storage 
Spent fuel pool cleaning and purification 
Pumps, motors, equipment, filters and demineralizers 400 
Spent fuel pool cleaning and purification piping system 40 
Reactor water cleanup system 
RWCU system pumps, motors and heat exchangers 120 
RWCU purification and filter equipment 80 
RWCU piping system 120 
Auxiliary cooling systems 
Plant chilled water system pumps, motors and heat transfer equipment 80 
Feed water system 
Feed Rater piping 70 
Fend water valves 850 
Other turbine plant equipment 
Main vapor system piping 50 
Main vapor system valves 260 
Main vapor system instrumentation and control 100 
(Roberson et al., 1984 ; Beal et al., 1987 ; White et al., 1984) 
Average of across-plant typical values, 
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Fig. 1. P W R  system/component  exposure rates. 
are listed in Table 6.6°Co has been found to be the greatest 
contributor to exposure, and its buildup results from crud 
deposited near low flow, dead-leg areas and becoming incor- 
porated in corrosion films (Roberson et al., 1984; Anstine, 
1983). '37Cs and 16N have also been found to contribute 
significantly to exposure (Roberson et al., 1984). The 
max imum flux of  the scattered photon cont inuum is expected 
between 50 and 150 keV, just  above the sharp rise in the 
photoelectric cross section for a toms in shielding materials. 
As crud (i.e. the long half-life radioactive deposits) builds 
with age, the relative contribution of  low-energy photons to 
dose declines (Roberson et al., 1982, 1984). Under  normal  
operating conditions, plantwise  average ? exposures range 
from about 0 to 1000 mrem h ', with an overall average on 
the order of  10 mrem h-~ (Roberson et al., 1984; White et 
al., 1984; VEPCo, 1979; SMUD,  1975). 
5. NEUTRON EXPOSURE 
For operating reactors it is also important  to consider 
the neutron exposure, especially with respect to potential 
radiation damage. Using a ? detection system to locate high 
neutron backgrounds is generally not  feasible, since away 
from the vessel there is little correlation between ? and neu- 
tron exposures, with ?/neutron ratios ranging from 0.08 to 
100. Usually, only a small percentage of the total radiation 
exposure is due to neutrons because intense neutron fields 
are not  as prevalent throughout  the plant as 7 fields (Ryan, 
1983). 
Determining the significant component  of  the neutron 
background (i.e. fast, epithermal or slow) is difficult. In some 
cases only the fast neutrons streaming from the vessel are 
significant contributors to the exposure (Uhrig, 1977). Sub- 
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Fig. 2. B W R  system/component  exposure rates. 
stantial neutron leakage from the reactor cavity occurs 
(Vergnaud et al., 1984) : 
(1) in the upper part  of  the reactor pit, in the air gap 
between the vessel and the biological shield wall, resulting in 
streaming into the refueling cavity and the operating deck 
(up t o 5 r e m h  1); 
(2) around coolant pipes, leading to escape into reactor 
coolant pump casemates (5 22 rem h -  ]) and the operating 
deck above (0.36-2.1 rem h ~) ; 
(3) into the keyways below the vessel ; 
(4) in the ionization chamber  openings on the operating 
deck (Kosako et al., 1984; Champion  et al., 1984) ; and 
(5) near the reactor vessel flange gap (Butler et al., 1979). 
In most  other cases, the contribution of  high-energy neu- 
trons to the dose is very small. Average energies are usually 
less than 100 keV with few neutrons having energies greater 
than 750 keV (Cummings  et aL, 1983; Endres et al., 1981). 
In general, thermal neutrons make up about  40%, epithermal 
50%, and fast neutrons 10% of  the total flux spectra (Ryan, 
1983; Earls and Blok, 1986). Under  normal  operating con- 
ditions away from the vessel, plantwide average neutron 
exposure rates can be expected to range from 0-1000 mrem 
h -  i, with an overall average on the order of  10 mrem h -  1 
during operation (Endres et al., 1981; VEPCo, 1979; 
SMUD,  1975 ; Walker and Davis, 1977). 
6. ACCIDENT CONDITIONS 
Under  abnormal  conditions such as an accident, exposures 
can reach critical levels so quickly that shielding both equip- 
ment  and personnel becomes difficult. Electronic failures at 
Chernobyl began at 60(~800 rad h-~, and the robot used 
there was completely disabled at 2000 rad h - ]  (Tulenko, 
1987). Fields reached 105 rad h 1 [A calculation has been 
performed to simulate a gap release leading to escape of the 
fission product  inventory from the fuel for power plants of  
U.S. design and similar results of  ~ 104 rad h -  ~ were obtained 
(Kenoyer et al., 1982).] Currently, the basement  of  the TMI  
plant has a field of  ~ 1200 rad h -  1. Locating sources of  this 
magnitude will not  be difficult if they are confined to "hot  
spots",  but  in the case of  a gaseous release, the release will 
create its own background to the extent that detecting its 
source will be difficult. Neutron fields will not  be the major 
concern in such accident situations, since the fission product 
release is thought  to produce the more significant hazard. 
7. SUMMARY 
Of the many factors to be accounted for when considering 
the expected radiation fields to be encountered, several points 
stand out. Plant 7 exposure rates were found to typically 
range from 0 to 1000 mrem h-1,  a l though near the vessel 
and localized hot spots, substantially larger values exist. 
Excepting areas such as BWR turbine floors, low-energy 
scatter photons dominate the spectra during both operating 
and shutdown conditions. These photons originate mainly 
from neutron activated corrosion and fission product 
accumulations, with 6°C0 being the major contributor to dose. 
Additional isotopes of  concern during operation are taN and 
~37Cs. Water chemistry has been shown to be a critical factor 
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Table 6. Sources of the photon background energy spectrum 
Half-life 
Isotope ?-energy (keV) (days) 
Neutron activated 
Sb 124 602.7, 722.8, 1691 60.2 
Ar 41 1294 0.0763 
C 15 5298 2.83x 10 s 
Co 58 810.8 70.91 
60 1173,1332 1924 
Cr 51 320.1 27.70 
D (n,?) 2200 
Fe 59 1099,1292 44.51 
(n,7) 4200, 5900, 6000, 7300,7600 
Mn 54 834.8 312.2 
56 846.8 0.1075 
Mo 99 140.5, 739.6 2.748 
101 192.0, 505.9, 9,590.9,1013 0.01014 
Ni 65 1482, 1116 0.1050 
N 16 6129, 7115 8.25 x 10-5 
Sn 113 391.7 115.1 
125m 332.0 6.61 x 10 3 
Xe 133 81.00 5.25 
135 249.8 0.379 
Zn 65 1116 243.8 
Zr/Nb 95 756.7, 724.2, 235.7, 7.778.2, 
568.9, 1091 64.03 
Zr 97 743.4 0.7 
Other: 
Annihilation 511 
Lead X-rays ~200 
(Roberson et al., 1984; Berry and Diegle, 1979) 
Fission products 
Cs 134 604.7, 795,8 753.7 
137 661.7 11,010 
I 131 364.5 8.040 
132 667.7, 772,6 0.950 
133 529.9 0.867 
134 847.0, 884,1 0.365 
135 1260, 1132, 526.6 0.2744 
136 1313, 1321 9.68 x 10 4 
Kr 83m 9.39 0.0775 
85m 151.2 0.187 
85 514 3913 
87 402.6 0.053 
88 2392, 196.3 0.118 
89 220.9, 585.8 0.00219 
90 1119, 1218, 5395 3.74 x 10 4 
Sr 89 909.2 50.52 
Xe 133 81.00 5.25 
135m 768.9 0.0106 
135 249.8 0.379 
137 455.5 0.00267 
138 258.4, 434.5, 1768, 2016 0.00979 
139 218.6, 296.5,174.9 4.6 x 10 4 
(Pigford, 1972) 
in overall plant  exposure rates. The exposure rates tend to 
level off after ~ I yr in PW R s  and ~ 4 yr in BWRs,  although 
for steam generators (a significant contributor to exposure 
in PWRs)  and on BWR  recirculation piping systems and 
turbine floors, the fields level off after ~ 5 yr. Away from the 
vessel, neutrons are generally not  significant contributors to 
total doses, and no correlation appears to exist between 7 
and neutron doses. 
The specific values presented here are meant  to provide 
rough estimates of  the expected field strengths found in shut- 
down and operating BWRs and PWRs. In order to be useful 
for shielding purposes, in certain cases the values presented 
may be conservatively high. Nevertheless, the data presented 
here represent the best estimates to date. In order to form a 
more comprehensive database on operating plants, those 
having additional information are encouraged to respond 
directly to the authors. 
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